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Abstract: This research examines the effect of earnings quality on the cost of equity and 
whether information asymmetry affects the relationship as a mediator. A hundred and 
twenty-three manufacturing companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange during 
2007-2012 were selected through a purposive sampling method. This study uses 
absolute discretionary accruals (|DA|) to measure earnings quality, bid-ask spread to 
proxy information asymmetry, and CAPM to measure the cost of equity. Using the 
bootstrapping method in the hypotheses testing, this study finds a significant negative 
effect of earnings quality on the information asymmetry. However, there is no support 
on the positive association between information asymmetry and the cost of equity, as 
well as the role of information asymmetry as a mediator on the negative association 
between earnings quality and cost of equity.  
 
Keywords: bootstrapping, discretionary accrual, bid-ask spread, capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) 
 
Abstrak: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji pengaruh kualitas laba terhadap kos 
ekuitas dan apakah asimetri informasi berperan sebagai mediator. Seratus dua puluh 
tiga perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia selama 2007-2012 
dipilih melalui metode purposive sampling. Penelitian ini menggunakan absolute 
discretionary accruals (|DA|) untuk mengukur kualitas laba, bid-ask spread untuk 
mengukur asimetri informasi, dan CAPM untuk mengukur biaya ekuitas. Dengan 
menggunakan metode bootstrapping dalam pengujian hipotesis, penelitian ini 
menemukan bahwa kualitas laba berpengaruh negatif terhadap asimetri informasi. 
Namun, tidak ada dukungan pada hubungan positif antara asimetri informasi dan biaya 
ekuitas, serta peran asimetri informasi sebagai mediator pada hubungan negatif antara 
kualitas laba dan biaya ekuitas. 
.  
 
Kata Kunci: bootstrapping, discretionary accrual, bid-ask spread, capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) 
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1. Introduction 
The borderless economy, as a result of the development of the world economy, has 
caused unlimited capital flows as the borders of a state no longer limit the business 
processes. This situation increases the complexity in the process of deploying an 
enterprise, including in the preparation of financial statements as a media of 
communications between the company and the stakeholder (ADBI, 2014). This 
complexity should not detract from the quality of the information generated from the 
financial statements (PWC, 2011).  
Indonesia, as one of the countries in the world, is also impacted by economic 
development. Capital inflows to Indonesia facilitate companies to raise capital, thus 
increasing the number of listed companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange. In addition to 
capital inflows, increasing public knowledge about the types of stock investment played 
a role in increasing demand for stock investment. 
The data from the IDX fact book shows high numbers of transactions and flows of 
public funds into the capital markets accounted by the listed company (see appendix 
table 1). The number of listed companies and share transactions in the Indonesia capital 
market for ten-years from 2004 to 2008 is also growing, despite a decline in 2008 and 
2009 due to economic crisis. Thus, listed companies have a responsibility to investors 
and other stakeholders in reporting financial statements. 
Accounting information plays a fundamental role as a basis in the capital allocation 
in the financial markets. An essential characteristic of the quality of accounting 
information is the extent to which earnings (accrual) mapped in cash flows. A poor 
mapping of accrual in cash flows will reduce the content and quality of reported earnings 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2011). As investors have a different capacity in processing financial 
information, the risk of information asymmetry is increasing. 
The analytical models by Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) predicted 
that different information among market participants would increase the risk of adverse 
selection by fund providers. Accordingly, fund providers demand higher compensation 
and widen the spread between the bid price and the asking price, which will reduce 
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liquidity and increase the cost of capital. As a result, the determinants and consequences 
of earnings quality become an interest for investors, managers, regulators, and standard 
setters. 
Campbell et al. (2001) found that poor earnings quality related to company 
volatility. Increasing numbers of new companies and much less profitable in initial 
public offerings affect the quality of earnings of the company, as well as improve the 
usefulness of information for sophisticated investors that would further worsen the 
information asymmetry. Also, there is a theoretical debate about whether earnings 
quality affects the cost of equity. Francis et al. (2005; 315) tested whether the accruals 
quality is a determinant of the cost of equity. This study found that earnings quality 
affected the cost of equity economically and statistically significant. Francis et al. (2005) 
made a conclusion based on the assumption that the information risk was a risk factor 
that was reflected in the price. 
Core et al. (2008) found that time-series regression of companies’ stock return that 
was the object of Francis et al. (2005) research did not examine whether accrual quality 
was a risk factor that is reflected in the price. Whether information risk can be 
diversified or not is still questionable in the literature. This study is expected to 
contribute to the debate by testing whether information asymmetry mediates the 
relationship between poor earnings quality relationships and a high cost of equity. 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1.  Earnings Quality                          
Earnings quality related to the ability of a company's reported earnings to estimate 
the company's actual earnings in the future. Schipper and Vincent (2003) suggested 
three criteria of earnings quality: persistence, ability to predict, and relatively low 
variability. 
According to another opinion, Dechow et al. (2010) stated that earnings quality 
was high if they met the following characteristics: 1) reflected accurately the company's 
operational performance, 2) provided a good indicator of the performance of the 
company in the future, and 3) served as a measure to assess the company. Dechow et 
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al. (2010) also stated that good earnings quality was able to represent the process of the 
company's reported earnings and useful for decision-making for its users. 
Earnings information must have integrity; the earnings numbers are not generated 
from business management to manipulate earnings to increase a company's reported 
earnings. Earnings information must also be reliable; profit can provide a good indicator 
of the company's performance. 
 
2.2. Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry occurs when one of the parties (traders) have superior 
information than the other parties that enable them to take advantage and leaving others 
with the loss. In such a situation, private information was only received by informed 
traders (Hartono, 2013). 
The perspective of information asymmetry implies that managers strive to 
maximize the value of the company in self-interested ways (i.e., opportunistic). Quality 
of accounting information is useful in reducing information asymmetry. When 
information asymmetry occurs, the disclosure of decisions made by managers can 
influence stock prices because of the gap between informed investors and less informed 
investors will create a cost of transactions and reduce the expected liquidity in the 
market (Komalasari, 2000). 
 
2.3. Cost of Equity 
The cost of equity is the rate of return expected by equity investors is a premium 
for equity risk in investment. It is the rate of return demanded by investors on an equity 
investment in a company. 
One of the simplest and the most widely used models to estimate the cost of capital 
is by using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). CAPM model is an essential part 
of the financial sector that is used to predict the relationship between the expected return 
(historical data) and the risk of an asset. CAPM that developed by Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965) is one of many tools in finance that can be used to estimate the cost of 
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equity, in which case the expected rate of return is a function consisting of the risk-free 
rate and the market-specific risk premium (Bodie et al., 2009: 280). 
 
2.4. Prior Research and Hypothesis Development 
2.4.1. Earnings Quality and Information Asymmetry 
There are several models of research on how earnings information can affect 
information asymmetry, of which Verrechia (1982) concluded that an increase of public 
information lowers the cost of the search for private information. Increased public 
information also reduced the incentive for investors who do not obtain private 
information and reduced speculative behavior among investors (Callahan, 1997: 51). 
Diamond (1985) and Diamond and Verrechia (1991) showed that high-quality 
financial reporting could reduce the level of information asymmetry among traders and 
reduced the cost of equity. Battacharya et al. (2011) reported that poor earnings quality 
significantly affects high information asymmetry. Prior studies suggested that when 
public companies announced earnings with poor quality, they tend to have higher 
information asymmetry. Accordingly, this study hypothesizes: 
H1: A company with poor earnings quality will have higher information asymmetry. 
 
2.4.2.  Information Asymmetry and Cost of Equity 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (2000) revealed that selective 
disclosure leads to adverse selection behavior (information asymmetry), which would 
trigger demand premium by investors for higher risk assets, therefore increasing the 
company's higher cost of equity. The differences in information distribution among 
market participants lead to a difference in expectations of trading security. Specifically, 
Easley and O'Hara (2004) analyzed the differences between public information and 
private information. They argued that less informed traders recognized themselves as 
less advantaged in terms of acquisition of information, and just kept fewer assets as a 
consequence. It would cause the securities to become illiquid with a high degree of 
private information (information asymmetry) (Lambert et al., 2011). 
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The empirical model initiated by Callahan et al. (1997) showed the relationship 
between accounting information and the bid-ask spread. Research by Callahan et al. 
(1997) was based on the premise that there were parties with more information about 
the real value of the company compared to others, which then lead to the bid-ask spread. 
Theoretically, Amihud and Mendelson (1996) stated that securities with a wide 
range of bid-ask spread tend to have a higher cost of equity so that investors demanded 
higher returns as compensation for the additional cost of a transaction. 
H2: A company with higher information asymmetry will have a higher cost of equity. 
 
2.4.3.  Earnings Quality, Information Asymmetry, and Cost of Equity 
Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) stated the more disclosures, the lower uncertainty 
of investors, at the condition of ceteris paribus, especially if the disclosure contained 
accounting information. At the lower uncertainty, investors will be more willing to 
accept a lower dividend payment. The low dividend payout will reduce the cost of 
equity because of low expected risk by investors. It lowers the interest cost of 
investment activities, thus increasing the chances of the company to get higher 
profitability project, investors will be expected to react positively to the payment of 
dividends in the future. The low risk expected by investors means low cost of equity for 
the company. Based on that, the model of the association between earnings quality and 
cost of equity through information asymmetry as follows: 
Gambar 1. 
Research Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poor Earnings 
Quality 
Information Asymmetry 
Cost of Equity 
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Based on the explanation above, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: The negative association between earnings quality and cost of equity in a company 
is mediated through its information asymmetry 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Data and Sample 
This study uses companies in the manufacturing industries listed on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2011. This study period is based on the consideration that 
starting in 2012, the reporting standards in Indonesia are fully convergent with IFRS. 
We select companies in the manufacturing industry because it dominates the number of 
listed companies, compare to other industry (142 out of 459, fact book 2013) with more 
diverse industry characteristics.  
3.2. Measurement 
3.2.1.  Independent Variable: Earnings Quality (X) 
This study uses the absolute discretionary accruals (|DA|), modified Jones model 
(1991) to measure earnings quality. Higher discretionary accruals represent lower 
earnings quality. Here are the steps to determine the |DA|: 
1. Regress companies in the manufacturing industry using the modified Jones model 
to obtain the value of α, β_1, dan β_2. 
 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑖.𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖.𝑡−1
= 𝛼 +  𝛽1
∆ 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖.𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖.𝑡−1
+  𝛽2
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖.𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖.𝑡−1
+  𝜀𝑖.𝑡                                (1) 
 
Where: 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑖.𝑡 = total current accruals (net income – cash flow from the operation) in year t for 
firm i 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖.𝑡−1 = total asset in year t  for firm i 
∆ 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖.𝑡 = change in revenue at the period t and t-1 
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖 .𝑡 = cash flow from operation  
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖.𝑡  = Gross value of Plant, Property, and Equipment at the period t for firm i  
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∆𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 = change in a current asset at the period t-1 and t1 
𝜺𝑖.𝑡 = error term in year t for firm i  
 
2. Calculating the value of non-discretionary accrual by using the following formula: 
                          (2) 
3.  Determine the value of discretionary accruals by using the following formula:  
𝐷𝐴𝐽.𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝐶 𝑖.𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖.𝑡−1
−  𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐽.𝑡                                                                (3)                   
                                                                                        
3.2.2.  Dependent Variable: Information Asymmetry (M) 
Information asymmetry is measured using the bid-ask spread. It operated as 
follows: 
SPREADit =
(𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  −  𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡) 
( 𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡  + 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡)/2
 
(4) 
Spread is a proxy of information asymmetry, askit is the sales offer price of shares, 
and bidit is a firm purchase price of firm i at the period t. Information asymmetry 
obtained from market data at the date of a financial statement published until the 5th 
day (H0 – H+5). 
 
3.2.3.  Dependent Variable: Cost of Equity (Y) 
According to the CAPM method (Sharpe, 1964, cited in Hartono, 2013: 529), the 
calculation of the cost of equity is written in the following formula: 
𝐸 (𝑅𝑖) = 𝑅𝐵𝑅 + 𝛽𝐼  (𝐸(𝑅𝑚) − 𝑅𝐵𝑅) (5) 
Where: 
 𝐸(𝑅𝑖) = expected return 
𝑅𝐵𝑅 = risk-free rate 
𝛽 = systematic risk 
𝑅𝑚 = market return 
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3.3. Diagnostic Tests 
Before the hypotheses testing, the data need to be examined for any deviations 
from normality and BLUE assumptions, including a multicollinearity test by observing 
the value of variance inflating factor (VIF), autocorrelation test with Durbin Watson 
(DW) statistical testing, and heteroscedasticity test with Glejser test. 
3.4. Mediation Tests 
Mediation test consists of two alternatives, the first is a causal step initiated by 
Baron and Kenny (1986), and the second alternative is initiated by Rucker et al. (2011). 
3.4.1.  First Alternative 
According to Baron and Kenny (1986: 1177) there are three stages to test the 
mediating effect, known as causal steps, they are: 
1. In the first step, examine the effect of the independent variable (X) to the mediating 
variable (M), and significant at P<0.05. 
        SPREAD𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝚎𝑡                             (6) 
Where: 
SPREAD𝑖,𝑡  = information asymmetry in year t of firm i 
𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 = discretionary accruals in year t for firm i 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
YEAR 
= company size; market capitalization  
= dummy variable, when financial statement published 
  
 
 
2. The second step, examine the effect of mediating variable (M) to the dependent 
variable (Y), and significant at P<0.05.   
      CoE𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼2 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝚎𝑡                         (7)  
3. The third step, examine the effect of the independent variable, mediating variable 
(M), and dependent variable (Y) simultaneously. 
CoE𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼3 + 𝛽7𝐷𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡−1 +  𝛽8𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝚎𝑡     (8) 
 
The three equations above examine the relationship between variables in the model 
of mediation, and the effect of mediation occurs when (1) a significant influence on the 
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independent variables to mediators in the 6th equation, (2) significant influence of 
mediating variables on the dependent variable in the 7th equation, (3) significant 
influence of variables independent of the dependent variable in the 8th equation, and 
(4) direct influence of independent variables on the dependent variable is reduced in the 
presence of mediators (Baron and Kenny, 1986; 1177). The significance test of 
mediation models uses the Sobel (1982) model. 
 
2.4.2. Second Alternative 
Preacher and Hayes (2004) stated that the critical component of the analytical 
procedure of mediation test is the significance of indirect effect (a x b). Although the 
analytical procedures recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) are more commonly 
used, the method is intended only for the data with a large sample size (Preacher and 
Hayes, 2008). 
Baron and Kenny (1986) stated that the Sobel test could be used as a significant 
test for the indirect effect of the mediation model. Sobel test required normal 
distribution data. However, it is challenging to meet this assumption. Preacher and 
Hayes (2008) recommend the use of bootstrapping, non-parametric statistical tests with 
resampling procedure, which is used for testing mediation and do not require normal 
distribution data. Bootstrapping is recommended to test mediation as compared with 
the Sobel test (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). This is to avoid a Type I error when a normal 
distribution cannot be met. 
4. Results and Discussion 
The sample in this study is selected using purposive sampling according to the 
criteria. This study uses 381 manufacturing companies from 2007 to 2011. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 (see appendix) shows the descriptive statistics of variables, discretionary 
accruals (DA), market capitalization or SIZE, and CAPM during the observation year, 
from 2007 to 2011, and SPREAD in 2008 to 2012, the year in which the financial 
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statements released. Jembo Cable Company Tbk (JECC) in 2010 shows that the 
minimum value of | DA | is 0.000, while the maximum value of 0.4658 is shown by PT 
Asia Pacific Fibers Tbk (POLY) in the same year. The average | DA |  of 0.0809 and 
the standard deviation of 0.0800 is relatively more substantial than the average value, 
and standard deviation of ABSDA or absolute discretionary accruals reported on 
Fatmawati and Sabeni (2013)'s study (i.e., 0.0217 and 0.0550) in  2011. The high value 
of| DA | denotes the magnitude of the company’s discretionary accrual, which indicates 
lower earnings quality. 
The lowest SPREAD of 0.0018 is shown by the share transactions of PT Gudang 
Garam Tbk (GGRM) in 2010, and the highest SPREAD of 0.5341 is indicated by the 
stock transaction Kedaung Indah Can. Tbk (KICI) in 2007. The average SPREAD of 
0.0497 and the standard deviation of 0.1138 are relatively lower than those of 0.39249 
and 0.18754 reported in the study of Ningrum (2010). A higher SPREAD value 
indicates high information asymmetry. Thus, companies in this study show relatively 
lower information asymmetry compared to information asymmetry reported by 
Ningrum (2010). 
The smallest SIZE of the company's market capitalization of Rp4,62 billion is 
indicated by Siwani Makmur PT TBK (SIMA) in 2008, and the most significant 
companies size of  173,273 billion is shown by PT Hanjaya Mandala Sampoerna Tbk 
(HMSP) in 2011. PT Kertas Basuki Rachmat Indonesia Tbk shows the minimum value 
of CAPM (-1.0744). (KBRI) in 2009, and the maximum value (2.2426) is shown by PT 
Lotte Chemical Titan Tbk. (FPNI) in 2009. The average CAPM (0.6833) and the 
standard deviation (0.4665) are relatively higher than the CAPM value reported in the 
study Susanto and Siregar (2012), with a study period in 2009 (0.1354 and 0.0444). 
4.2. Diagnostic Test 
As shown in Table 3, Model 1 is normally distributed; however, Model 2 is not 
distributed normally. Tolerance values in table 4 show less than 0,1, and VIF values 
show greater than 10. Therefore, there is no serious threat of multicollinearity between 
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the independent variable in the model. The statistical test shows Durbin-Watson (DW) 
value (1.946) in between dU and 4-DU (1.679<DW<2.321), we may conclude that there 
is no autocorrelation. Glejser test shows a significant result so that there is 
multicollinearity in this model.  
Overall, the diagnostic tests show that these research models meet the assumption 
of multicollinearity and autocorrelation, but do not meet the assumptions of normality 
and heteroscedasticity. Following Rucker et al. (2011), this study uses the second 
alternative to test mediation, as the first alternative requires normal data distribution.  
4.3. Multivariate Tests 
Bootstrapping is used to test the hypothesis following Hayes (2014). Bootstrapping 
is a method to estimate standard error and interval for coefficient correlation or 
regression, which cannot meet classic assumptions (Widiarso, 2012). 
4.3.1. Earnings Quality and Information Asymmetry 
Hypothesis 1 tests whether poor earnings quality, which is measured by absolute 
discretionary accruals, affects high information asymmetry (SPREAD), with company 
size (SIZE) and year (D2007, D2008, D2009, and D2010) as the covariate variables. 
The result is reported in Table 7 (see appendix). 
The value of R2 in Table 7 (see appendix) is 0.3267. It means that the independent 
variable explains 32.67% of the variation of the independent variable. The remaining 
67.33% is explained by other factors. The coefficient of |DA| is 0.0058 (p<0.05). It 
indicates a positive association between discretionary accruals and information 
asymmetry, suggesting that firms with higher earnings quality tend to have lower 
information asymmetry. This supports hypothesis 1. The coefficient of SIZE is -0.0135 
(p<0.001). Thus larger companies tend to have lower information asymmetry. The 
dummy years’ coefficients are all significant, i.e. 0.0466  (p<0.01), 0.0182 (p<0.05), 
0.0091 (p<0.01), and 0.0111 (p<0.01) for 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively.  
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4.3.2. Information Asymmetry and Cost of Equity 
Hypothesis 2 tests whether asymmetry information (SPREAD) affects the cost of 
equity (CAPM), with company size (SIZE) and year (D2007, D2008, D2009, and 
D2010) as the covariate variables. The result is presented in Table 8 (see appendix). 
The value of R2 in Table 8 (see appendix) is 0.3267. It means that the independent 
variable explains 32.67% of the variation of the independent variable. The remaining 
67.33% is explained by other factors.  
The coefficient of |DA| are -0.0153 (p=-0.4068). Thus |DA| does not have a 
significant effect on the cost of equity. Accordingly, hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
SPREAD shows the coefficient of -1.3122 (p<0.01), showing that information 
asymmetry has a significant and positive association with the cost of equity. The finding 
does not support hypothesis 2, which predicts that higher information asymmetry is 
associated with a higher cost of equity. 
4.3.3. Earnings Quality, Information Asymmetry, and Cost of Equity 
Table 9 (see appendix) shows the test result of the mediation test using 
bootstrapping.  The value of R2 in this model is 0.0715. It means that the independent 
variable explains 7.15 % of the variation of the dependent variable. The remaining 
92.85% is explained by other factors.  
The coefficient value of path a, which tests the association between earnings 
quality and information asymmetry, is 0.0058 (p<0.05). This shows that earnings 
quality significantly affects information asymmetry. A higher |DA| represents a lower 
quality of earnings. The coefficient value of path b, the association between information 
asymmetry and cost of equity, is -1.3122 (p<0.05).  This indicates that information 
asymmetry significantly affects the cost of equity. The negative coefficient value shows 
the negative association between information asymmetry and the cost of equity. 
The coefficient value of path a and b (indirect effect) is -0.0076 but not significant. 
Therefore hypothesis 3 is not supported. The mediating effect of information 
asymmetry on the association between poor earnings quality and the cost of equity is 
The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research – Sept, Vol. 23, No.2, 2019 
 
410 
 
not supported in this research. This is not in line with the results of the study by 
Bhattacharya et al. (2012), which states that poor earnings quality affects the cost of 
equity through information asymmetry. 
5. Conclusion, Implication, and Limitation 
5.1. Conclusion 
This research examines the effect of earnings quality on the cost of equity and whether 
information asymmetry affects the relationship as a mediator. We find that poor 
earnings quality (i.e., discretionary accruals) positively affects information asymmetry. 
This finding suggests that when earnings quality is poor, the information asymmetry 
will increase. 
Further, this study finds a negative association between information asymmetry and 
cost of equity; thus, higher information asymmetry is associated with a lower cost of 
equity. This finding is not in line with the proposed hypothesis 2, which predicts that a 
higher the information asymmetry will result in a higher cost of equity. Lastly, we find 
that poor earnings quality negatively affects the cost of equity through information 
asymmetry, suggesting that poor earnings quality will lower the costs of equity with the 
presence of information asymmetry. This is not in line with the proposed hypothesis 3, 
which predicts that information asymmetry mediates the association between poor 
earnings quality and high cost of equity. 
5.2. Limitation 
The results show a negative correlation between poor earnings quality with the cost 
of equity and also a negative correlation between information asymmetry with the cost 
of equity; thereby, hypotheses 2 and 3 are not supported. The use of CAPM as the proxy 
for the cost of equity is an alternative explanation over the result. Diegnau and Masten 
(2014), and Fama and French (2004) stated that the use of the CAPM as proxy for cost 
of equity was less precise because CAPM only took market risk into account and not 
included other factors such as the size of the company (size) and the company's value 
(value) (three-factor model). Also, the cost of equity should also include the analysis of 
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the value line, dividend forecast, and dividend growth rate, such as initiated by Brav et 
al. (2005). 
 
5.3. Recommendation 
Based on the results and limitations of this study, we suggest future studies to use 
another proxy to determine the cost of equity, for example, the three-factor models, as 
suggested by Diegnau and Masten (2014), and Fama and French (2004). Further, future 
studies should also add other variables that can affect the cost of equity, such as the 
probability of informed trading (PIN), adverse selection as a component of information 
asymmetry, and corporate disclosure policies. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 
Investment Development 
 
Year 
Number of  
Companies 
Transaction Volume  Transaction 
Frequency 
Stock 
Issuance (Milion Shares) 
2004 331        411.768        3.724      2.141  
2005 336        401.868        4.012      3.545  
2006 344        436.936        4.811      3.005  
2007 383      1.039.542       11.861    16.868  
2008 396        787.846       13.417    24.388  
2009 398      1.467.659       20.977      3.854  
2010 420      1.330.865       25.919    29.678  
2011 440      1.203.550       28.023    19.593  
2012 462      1.053.762       29.941    10.234  
2013 483      1.342.657       37.499    16.747  
                  Source: IDX Fact Book 2004 - 2013 
 
 
 
Tabel 2 
Variable Statistics Descriptive 
 
  N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
|DA| 381 0,0000 0,4658 0,0809 0,0800 
SPREAD 381 0,0018 0,5342 0,0497 0,0748 
SIZE 381 4.625.000 173.272.990.800 5.851.125.960 18.294.848.943 
CAPM 381 -1,0744 2,2426 0,6833 0,4666 
 
|DA|=absolut discretionary accrual, SPREAD=information asymmetry,  
SIZE=market capitalization (thousand rupiah, CAPM=cost of equity. 
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Diagnostic Test 
Tabel 3 
Normality Test 
 
Model Hipotesis 1 
Unstandardized 
Residual 
Model Hipotesis 2 dan 3 
Unstandardized 
Residual 
N 381 N 381 
Normal 
Parametersa,b 
Mean 0 
Normal 
Parametersa,b 
Mean 0 
Std. 
Deviation 
0.06670843 
Std. 
Deviation 
0.44096 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute 0.194 Most 
Extreme 
Differences 
Absolute 0.026 
Positive 0.194 Positive 0.026 
Negative -0.122 Negative -0.02 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 3.795 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 0.516 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0 Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0.953 
 
Table 4 
Multicollinearity Test 
 
Model 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant)     
|DA| 0.978 1.022 
SPREAD 0.796 1.257 
SIZE 0.838 1.194 
D2007 0.652 1.533 
D2008 0.717 1.394 
D2009 0.644 1.552 
D2010 0.669 1.494 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Autocorrelation Test 
 
R 
R 
Square 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
.327a 0,107 0,107 6.366 7 373 0 1.946 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SPREAD, D2009, |DA|, D2008, D2010, 
   SIZE, D2007     
b. Dependent Variable: CAPM 
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Tabel 6 
Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t p-value B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .162 .165   .983 .326 
|DA| .003 .011 .012 .240 .810 
SIZE .008 .008 .057 1.026 .306 
D2007 -.005 .045 -.008 -.120 .905 
D2008 .016 .048 .021 .345 .731 
D2009 .041 .040 .065 1.022 .307 
D2010 -.014 .042 -.022 -.346 .730 
SPREAD .523 .208 .144 2.519 .012 
 
Tabel 7 
Regression Result of Hypothesis 1  
 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Expected 
Direction 
Constanta 0,3278 0,0000 + 
|DA| 0,0058 0,0106 + 
SIZE -0,0135 0,0000 − 
D2007 0,0466 0,0000  
D2008 0,0182 0,0104  
D2009 0,0091 0,0081  
D2010 0,0111 0,0098  
Adj. R2 0,3267 
F-Stat. 9,4644 (p<0.001) 
 
Table 8 
Regression Result of Hypothesis 2  
 
Variabel Coefficient Coefficient p-value 
Expected 
Direction 
Konstanta 0,2446 0,9189 0,3588 + 
SPREAD  -1,3122 0,4511 0,0038 − 
|DA| -0,0153 0,0184 0,4068 − 
SIZE 0,023 0,0123 0,0611 + 
D2007 0,1649 0,0681 0,0160  
D2008 0,0182 0,0756 0,4213  
D2009 -0,1224 0,0702 0,0819  
D2010 -0,1032 0,0634 0,1044  
Adj. R2 0,3267 
F-Stat. 9,4644 (p<0.001) 
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Tabel 9 
Regression Result of Hypothesis 3  
 
Koefisien Regresi Nilai Prob BootLLCI BootULCI 
a 0,0058 0,0106 - - 
b -1,3122 0,0038 - - 
Indirect path -0,0076 - -0,2622 -0,0174 
Adj. R2 0,3267 
F-Stat. 9,4644 (p<0.001) 
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